Another day, another jihad attack. another chorus of journalists and politicians telling us it had nothing to do with Islam. “It was mental illness, bigot. And even if it wasn’t, it’s nothing to do with ordinary, decent, hard-working Muslims.”
In the moral perversion that has come to define our ruling class response to jihad violence, Muslims become the victims of their own attacks. There may well be mental illness at play here. But not in the Muslims: in the journalists, politicians and public officials who shill for them. This is Stockholm syndrome writ large on a civilisational scale.
Kidnap victims unconsciously internalise the mindset of their aggressors. They begin to see things from their point of view. The psychological impulse behind it seems to be a desperate desire to believe that the kidnappers are decent people and therefore less likely to commit an atrocity; this reduces anxiety in the potential victim. Mimicking the ideology of the aggressors may also make potential victims appear more sympathetic to them, and therefore less likely to be targeted.
The most sinister aspect of this process is that, for the most part, it is not a choice made deliberately by the kidnapped person. It is, rather, a subconscious psychological impulse, a survival instinct that must have proved its evolutionary utility in times past, otherwise it would not be so widespread now. Muslims have effectively hijacked our countries and a Stockholm Syndrome-afflicted ruling class is taking us on the path to destruction.
An alternative approach is suggested by a recently published paper about jihad violence in India. Basically, there isn’t much of it, given that India has the world’s second largest Muslim population. Why is it so low? The author surmises that Muslims fear mob violence in retaliation for any jihad attacks they carry out and therefore police their own behaviour. Muslims inform on other Muslims when they find out they’re up to something.
…this paper proposes a novel argument to explain why minority
Indian Muslims want to prevent militancy within their community: They fear retaliatory indiscriminate mob violence because they lack confidence in the government to protect them from the mob. Due to considerable grievances and appeals by militant groups (e.g., al-Qaeda), substantial militant sentiments could exist within the Indian Muslim population. However, this perceived threat of retaliatory indiscriminate mob violence incentivizes Indian Muslims to inform on individuals that are planning to engage in militant violence. Due to this high rate of informing, potential militants are deterred from following through on their actions. Therefore, under these circumstances, we would observe few Indian Muslims participating in militancy. Indiscriminate mob violence is not the same as indiscriminate state-led violence. The latter can either backfire on the state (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007; Kocher et al., 2011; Condra and Shapiro, 2012; Benmelech et al., 2014) or damage militant support (Lyall, 2009). I reason that indiscriminate mob violence exhibits a unique deterrent threat that is distinct in both nature and effect from collective punishment enacted by the state. Using this reasoning, I argue that the credible threat of indiscriminate mob violence would almost always suppress militancy within a marginalized minority.
After every attack in the West, the ruling class goes through the same routine: expresses sympathy for Muslims, insists it has nothing to do with Islam, deploys resources to shield Muslims from any retaliation. This paper suggests that approach may be counterproductive. Instilling fear in Muslims may instead induce a favourable change in their behaviour.
If we assume that no western government is likely to sanction mob violence against Muslims any time soon, other forms of collective punishment could be contemplated that might have the same effect.
For example, every time a jihad attack occurs, the number of perpetrators involved could be counted. Multiply by 100 and demolish that number of mosques, selected at random. Also demolish every mosque the terrorists ever attended. Multiply by another 1000 and expel that number of Muslims from the country, selected at random.
In this way, a jihad attack with 2 perpetrators would result in the demolition of at least 200 mosques and the expulsion of 200,000 Muslims. This kind of collective punishment approach might produce the same self-policing behaviour we see in India. And, if not, jihad becomes a self-solving problem anyway, since the Muslim population of the country would be rapidly depleted as attacks continued.